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Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information can lead to a market collapse. Economic
and legal institutions–auditors, underwriters, accountants, used-car dealers, etc.–typically emerge
to limit adverse selection and allow markets to function, thereby rendering direct government
interventions unnecessary. If a market does collapse, however–presumably following the failure of
the institutions designed to prevent this collapse in the first place–a government might want to
intervene. This paper asks what form these interventions should take if the goal of policy is to
improve economic efficiency with minimal cost to taxpayers.
We study an economy with borrowing and investment under asymmetric information. Firms
receive profitable investment opportunities but have private information about the value of their
existing assets, as in Myers and Majluf (1984). Optimally chosen debt contracts can limit the
mispricing of securities used to raise capital, but cannot eliminate it since expected repayments
always increase with the quality of assets in place. Adverse selection occurs when good borrowers,
perceiving unfairly high capital costs drop out of the market, and lenders rationally charge a high
rates to the remaining ones. Lending and investment are, then, inefficiently low, and there is scope
for a government intervention.
We characterize cost-minimizing interventions that improve lending and investment and propose
implementations with standard financial contracts. When designing its intervention, the govern-
ment takes into account that participation in its program is a signal of private information used by
agents outside the program. Therefore, participation decisions affect outside options through sig-
naling, while outside options influence the cost of the program through participation constraints.
This feedback distinguishes our work from the standard mechanism-design literature, in which
outside options are exogenous.
The range of design choices–from the selection of types to the size of the program and the nature
of financial contracts to be offered–is broad. For instance, since good types are the ones leaving
the market, it might make sense for the government to try to selectively attract these types. To do
so, it might be optimal to offer securities other than those used by the market. On the one hand,
if the government succeeds, interventions could be cheap or even profitable. On the other hand, if
interventions are costly, it might be important to minimize the size of the program. Finally, the
government might be tempted to shut down private markets and be the sole provider of funds. Our
contribution is to clarify these ideas.
We derive five results. First, the government cannot selectively attract the best types, and
interventions are always costly. Second, the investment level achieved by a program is determined
by its impact on the borrowing rate of non-participating banks. Third, for a given impact on private
markets, the size of the program is irrelevant. In particular, the cost to taxpayers does not depend on
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how many firms participate. Fourth, it is strictly optimal to intervene with debt contracts, either
by lending directly or by guaranteeing privately-issued debt. Finally, given optimally designed
interventions, the government has no incentives to shut down private markets.
Our approach to uncovering the optimal mechanism is to focus on participation decisions and
their signaling properties. We first derive a single crossing property: Whenever a particular type
chooses to invest within the program rather than outside the program, all inferior types make the
same choice. Consequently, the government cannot selectively attract the best types. However, the
composition of types opting out of the program determines the outside marginal typ –the highest
type investing without government support–and the associated rate at which private lenders break
even. By considering only the participation constraints, we then derive a lower bound for the costs
of interventions. A key property of this lower bound is that it depends only on the outside market
rate. Conditional on the market rate, participation in the program can vary greatly but is irrelevant
because lending at the market rate is a zero net-present-value proposition.
We then return to our original design problem with participation, signaling, incentive and
investment constraints. We show that direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs are optimal,
for the following reasons. When the government announces its willingness to lend at a particular
rate, this rate becomes the equilibrium rate in the market. All investing types are indifferent
between opting in or out, and the equilibrium allocation of types between the market and the
government must be such that private lenders break even at the announced rate. Investment and
incentive constraints are then satisfied and, the government minimizes its expected loss since all
participation constraints are binding. Other programs (e.g., equity injections) are not optimal
because participation constraints cannot bind for several types at once. A corollary of our results
is that there is no need to shut down private markets. Without markets, the binding participation
constraints become incentive constraints. Since they refer to the same marginal type, the cost of
intervention is the same.
We finally extend our benchmark model by relaxing the assumption that investment opportu-
nities are the same for all types. Our results continue to hold with asymmetric information about
new opportunities. When we allow banks to choose the riskiness of their investments after they
opt into the program, we find that moral hazard is mitigated by the endogenous response of the
private interest rate, and can be eliminated by indexing the terms of the government’s program to
that rate.
Discussion of the literature
Our work is motivated by the history of financial crises. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) ana-
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lyze the evolution of two competing views of banking panics. The “random withdrawal” theory
(Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Bhattacharya and Gale 1987, Chari 1989) focuses on bank liabilities
and coordination among depositors. The “asymmetric information” theory emphasizes asymmetric
information about banks’ assets. According to Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Mishkin (1991),
the historical evidence supports the idea that asymmetric information plays a critical role in bank-
ing crises. Several features of the financial-market collapse in Fall 2008 also suggest a role for
asymmetric information (Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen 2008, Duffie 2009, Gorton 2009).1 Gov-
ernments stepped in with large-scale interventions, but there was no consensus about exactly which
programs should be offered.2 Finally, there is ample evidence that participation in government pro-
grams carries a stigma (Corbett and Mitchell 2000, Mitchell 2001, Ennis and Weinberg 2009).
Our paper builds on the rich literature that studies asymmetric information, following Akerlof
(1970), Spence (1974), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). It is useful to relate our work to the particular
branch that deals with security design. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that debt can be used to
reduce mispricing when issuers have private information. Brennan and Kraus (1987) consider
various financing strategies to reduce adverse selection. Technically, we build on the contribution
of Nachman and Noe (1994), who clarify the conditions under which debt is optimal in a multi-
type capital raising game. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) also discuss the optimality of debt when the
security design occurs before private information is learned.
Our paper is also related to the literature on government interventions to improve market
outcomes. Some of the literature deals specifically with bank bailouts. Gorton and Huang (2004)
argue that the government can bail out banks in distress because it can provide liquidity more
effectively than private investors. Diamond and Rajan (2005) show that bank bailouts can backfire
by increasing the demand for liquidity and causing further insolvency. Diamond (2001) emphasizes
that governments should bail out only the banks that have specialized knowledge about their
borrowers. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999) show that bailouts can be designed so as not to
1Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2008) discuss the collapse of the interbank market. Duffie (2009) discusses
the OTC and repo markets. In the OTC market, the range of acceptable forms of collateral was dramatically
reduced,“leaving over 80% of collateral in the form of cash during 2008,” while the “repo financing of many forms
of collateralized debt obligations and speculative-rate bonds became essentially impossible.” Gorton (2009) explains
how the complexity of securitized assets created asymmetric information about the size and the location of risk.
Investors and banks were unable to agree on prices for legacy assets or for bank equity. The classic references on
financial crises (Bagehot 1873, Sprague 1910) do not discuss the role of asymmetric information explicitly.
2In the U.S., the original TARP called for $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets but was transformed into a
Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to invest $250 billion in U.S. banks. As of August 2009, $307 billion of outstanding
debt was issued by financial companies and guaranteed by the FDIC. The treasury also insured $306 billions of
Citibank’s assets, and $118 billion of Bank of America’s. Soros (2009) and Stiglitz (2008) argue for equity injections;
Bernanke (2009) favors asset purchases and debt guarantee; Diamond, Kaplan, Kashyap, Rajan, and Thaler (2008)
view purchases and equity injection as the best alternatives; and Ausubel and Cramton (2009) argue for a careful
way to ‘price the assets, either implicitly or explicitly.’
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distort ex-ante lending incentives. Efficient bailouts are studied by Philippon and Schnabl (2009)
in the context of debt overhang, and by Farhi and Tirole (2009) in the context of collective moral
hazard, while Chari and Kehoe (2009) argue that the time inconsistency problem is more severe
for the government than for private agents.
Some papers study government interventions in the presence of competitive markets. Bond and
Krishnamurthy (2004) study enforcement when a defaulting borrower can only be excluded from
future credit markets. Bisin and Rampini (2006) argue that market access can be a substitute
for government’s commitment. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study the crowding-out effect of
government interventions in private insurance markets.3 Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009),
building on on Jacklin (1987), show how liquidity requirements can improve equilibrium allocations.
The critical difference is that, in our paper, government intervention affects market conditions
through signaling and adverse selection.
The most closely related papers are Minelli and Modica (2009) and Tirole (2010). Minelli and
Modica (2009), building on Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), model the intervention as a sequential game
between the government and a monopolistic lender. Like us, Tirole (2010) emphasizes the role of
endogenous outside options. Our models assume different frictions to limit the financing of new
projects. Tirole (2010) assumes moral hazard in addition to adverse selection, while we follow
Myers and Majluf (1984) and assume that returns of old and new projects are fungible. Some
results are, nonetheless, similar. For instance, Tirole (2010) also finds that the government cannot
selectively attract good types, and that it has no incentives to shut down private markets. Another
difference between our work and both Minelli and Modica (2009) and Tirole (2010) is that we allow
for continuous payoffs (as opposed to binary ones). This allows us to discuss security design.
We present our model in Section 1. In Section 2, we characterize its decentralized equilibria.
We formally describe the mechanism-design problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we characterize
lower bounds on the costs of government interventions. Those bounds can actually be achieved by
simple, common interventions as we show in Section 5. Section 6 discusses extensions, and we close
the paper with some final remarks in Section 7.
1 The Model
Our model has three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and a continuum of banks with pre-existing ‘legacy’ assets.
The banks start with private information regarding the quality of their legacy assets and receive the
3There is also an extensive literature on how government interventions can improve risk sharing. See Acemoglu,
Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008). For excellent surveys, see Kocherlakota (2006), Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning
(2006), and Kocherlakota (2009).
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opportunity to make new loans at time 1. To avoid confusion, we refer to the new loans that banks
make at time 1 as “new investments,” and we use “borrowing and lending” when banks borrow
from outside investors (or from other banks). The government can offer various programs at time
0, and banks can borrow and lend in a competitive market at time 1. We assume that all agents
are risk-neutral and we normalize the risk-free rate to zero.
Initial assets and cash balance
Banks start with cash and legacy assets, and no pre-existing liabilities.4 Cash is liquid and can be
kept, invested or lent at time 1. Let ct denote the cash holdings at the beginning of period t. All
banks start with c0 in cash, but c1 can differ from c0 if the government injects cash in the banks
at time 0. Cash holdings cannot be negative: ct ≥ 0 for all t.
The book value of legacy assets, A, is known, but some assets may be impaired and the eventual
payoff at time 2 is the random variable a ∈ [0, A]. Banks privately know their type θ, which
determines the conditional distribution of the value of legacy assets fa (a|θ). Types are drawn from
compact set Θ ⊂ [θ, θ¯] with cumulative distribution H (θ).
Investment and borrowing
Banks receive investment opportunities at time 1. Investment requires the fixed amount x and
delivers a random payoff v at time 2. Banks can borrow at time 1 in a competitive market. After
learning its type θ, a bank offers a contract
(
l, yl
)
to the competitive investors, where l is the
amount raised from investors at time 1, and yl is the schedule of repayments to investors at time
2. Without government intervention, the funding gap of the banks is l0 ≡ x− c0. The government
can reduce the funding gap with cash injections, denoted m. In this case, c1 = c0 +m and the bank
only needs to borrow l = l0−m. We use the generic notation l for the amount actually raised from
private investors. In period 2, the cash balance of the bank is c2(i) = c1 + l − x · i, and its total
income is
τ2(i) = c2(i) + a+ v · i, (1)
where i ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy for the decision to invest at time 1. Total bank income at time 2
depends on the realization of the two random variables a and v.
Assumptions
We assume in our benchmark model that all banks receive the same investment opportunities. The
random payoff v is distributed on [0, V ] according to the density function fv (v). Let v¯ ≡ E [v]
4This is without loss of generality if efficient renegotiation among creditors is possible. Impediments to renegoti-
ation can create debt overhang. This issue is analyzed in Philippon and Schnabl (2009).
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be the expected value of v. To make the problem interesting, we assume that new projects have
positive NPV and that banks need to borrow in order to invest: v¯ > x > c0. We further assume
that contracts can be written only on the total income of the bank at time 2:
Assumption A1: The only observable outcome is total income τ2 defined in equation (1).
Under Assumption 1, repayment schedules can be contingent on total income τ2 but not on a and
v separately. If a bank does not invest, it keeps c2 = c1, and its total income at time 2 is a+c1. If it
invests, it ends up with c2 = 0 and total income a+ v.
5 We define this total income conditional on
investment as: y ≡ a+ v. The distribution of y, which is the convolution of fa and fv, is denoted
by f . Since fa depends on θ, so does f . Let Y denote the support of y. We assume that Y ⊂ [0,∞)
is the same for all types and that f(y|θ) satisfies the strict monotone hazard rate property:
Assumption A2: For all (y, θ) ∈ Y ×Θ, f(y|θ) > 0, and f(y|θ)1−F (y|θ) is decreasing in θ .
Total income is used to repay the loans taken at time 1 according to a schedule yl. When the
government intervenes, the bank also might need to repay the government, according to a schedule
yg. Our last assumption is to impose a monotonicity condition on the repayment schedules.
Assumption A3: The repayment schedules yl and yg of private lenders and of the government
are non-decreasing in τ2.
Let us briefly discuss the main features of our model. We introduce a binary investment technology
to simplify the strategy space of banks, but it is easy to extend the model to partial investment,
for instance, by having i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. In order to stay close to the workhorse model of Myers and
Majluf (1984), we initially assume that all banks receive the same investment opportunities. In this
context, A1 makes private information relevant by preventing the parties from contracting directly
on v (by spinning off the new investment, for instance). As an extension, we introduce private
information on v in Section 6. Assumption A2 defines a natural ranking among types regarding
the quality of their legacy assets, from the worst type θ to the best type θ¯. The strict inequalities
in A2 are not crucial, but they simplify some of the proofs. We allow for a general set of types
Θ because, while much intuition can be obtained with just two types, the implementation results
are somewhat special for the two-type case, as we explain in Section 5. A3 has been standard in
the literature on financial contracting since Innes (1990) and Nachman and Noe (1994). It renders
optimal contracts more realistic by effectively smoothing sharp discontinuities in repayments, and
it can be formally justified by the possibility of hidden trades.6
5It will become clear that the government never finds it optimal to inject cash into the banks beyond m = l0.
6The justification is that if repayments were to decrease with income, the borrower could secretly add cash to
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2 Equilibria without Interventions
Because the credit market is competitive and investors are risk-neutral, in any candidate equilib-
rium, the expected repayments to the lenders must be at least the size of the loan
E
[
yl|I
]
≥ l, (2)
where I denotes the information set of the private lenders at the time they make the loan. Under
symmetric information, investment decisions would have been independent of the quality of legacy
assets, and all banks would invest since v¯ ≥ x. The symmetric-information allocation is an equi-
librium under asymmetric information when banks can issue risk-free debt. By contrast, adverse
selection can occur when new investments are risky and when there is significant downside risk on
legacy assets.
Contracting game
Banks offer financial contracts to investors. A contract specifies an amount borrowed at time 1,
denoted l, and a repayment schedule at time 2, denoted yl. The contracting game is potentially
complex because the kind of security a bank offers might signal its type. Under assumption A1
to A3, however, it is a standard result that all banks that invest offer the same security, and this
security is a debt contract.7 The intuition is that bad types want to mimic good types, while good
types seek to separate from bad types. Contracts with high repayments for low income realizations
are relatively more attractive for good types than for bad types. This is the core idea of Myers and
Majluf (1984) in a model with two types, extended by Nachman and Noe (1994) to an arbitrary
set of types.
Equilibria without government intervention
We have explained above that all investing banks offer the same debt contract. Our next step is to
characterize the set of banks that actually invest. Let r be the (gross) interest rate at which banks
borrow. We can define the expected repayment function for type θ as:
ρ (θ, rl) ≡
∫
Y
min (y; rl) f (y|θ) dy. (3)
the bank’s balance sheet by borrowing from a third party, obtaining the lower repayment, immediately repaying the
third party, and obtaining strictly higher returns. See Sections 3.6 and 6.6 in Tirole (2006) for further discussion.
7There are several ways to obtain this result. One is to let each bank offer one contract and solve the is-
suance/signaling game. Nachman and Noe (1994) show that the unique equilibrium is pooling on the same debt
contract as long as the distribution of payoffs can be ranked by hazard rate dominance (A2). Another way to obtain
the result is to follow Myerson (1983) and let banks offer a menu of securities in a first stage (see, also, Maskin and
Tirole (1992)). The inscrutability principle then ensures that no signaling occurs during the contract-proposal phase,
and we can focus on one incentive-compatible menu. Standard design arguments can then be used to show that,
under A1-A3, the best menu contains the same debt contract for all types that invest.
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For a given θ, the function ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in the face value rl. Under symmetric information,
the fair interest rate r∗θ on a loan l to a bank with type θ is implicitly given by l ≡ ρ (θ, r∗θ l). Since
ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in θ, the fair rate is decreasing in θ for any given l. With private information,
however, the interest rate cannot depend explicitly on θ, and higher types end up facing an unfair
rate. This is the source of adverse selection.
Without government intervention, banks need to borrow l = l0 ≡ x− c0. Given a market rate
r, a type θ wants to invest if and only if E [a|θ] + v¯ − ρ (θ, rl0) ≥ E [a|θ] + c0. The investment
condition under asymmetric information is, therefore,8
v¯ − x ≥ ρ (θ, rl0)− l0. (4)
The term ρ (θ, rl0)− l0 measures the informational rents paid by the bank. The rents are zero when
the rate is fair. The information cost is positive when r > r∗θ and negative (a subsidy) when r < r
∗
θ .
When informational rents are too large, banks might decide not to invest.
Since the right-hand side of equation (4) is increasing in θ, if θ wants to invest at rate r, any
type below θ also wants to invest at that same rate. The set of investing types is, therefore, [θ, θˆ],
and the marginal type θˆ is defined by
v¯ − x ≡ ρ
(
θˆ, rl0
)
− l0. (5)
The borrowing rate depends on the market’s perception about the mix of banks that invest. Let
h (.|1) describe the market’s beliefs about the type of banks that borrow to invest. Investors’ beliefs
must be consistent with Bayes’ rule: H (θ|1) = H (θ) /H
(
θˆ
)
if θ ∈
[
θ, θˆ
]
, and 0 otherwise. Finally,
the rate r must satisfy the zero-profit condition for private investors:
l0 =
∫ θˆ
θ
ρ (θ, rl0) dH (θ|1) . (6)
Proposition 1 The efficient outcome is sustainable without government intervention if and only if
there is a borrowing rate r such that (4) and (6) hold for θˆ = θ¯. All other equilibria have θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯)
and are inefficient.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. The potential for adverse selection exists because
the investment condition (4) is more likely to hold for low types than for high types.9 Multiple
equilibria are possible because of the endogenous response of the interest rate. Let r0 denote the
8We use the conventional assumption that, when indifferent, banks choose to invest.
9If the scale of investment were a choice variable, the separating equilibrium would involve good banks scaling
down to signal their types. With our technological assumption, they scale down to zero. The only important point
is that in both cases the equilibrium can be inefficient.
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lowest interest rate that can be supported without government intervention, and let θˆ
0
be the
corresponding threshold. The best decentralized equilibrium
(
r0, θˆ
0
)
depends on c0 and on the
prior distribution of types.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine cases where the efficient outcome is not sustainable
as a decentralized equilibrium-i.e., θˆ
0
< θ¯. It is clear that higher cash levels increase θˆ
0
and improve
economic efficiency. Therefore, governments might seek to inject liquidity into the banks. Our goal
is to design the most cost-effective interventions that achieve a given level of investment. We do so
formally in the next sections.
3 Mechanism Design with a Competitive Fringe
In this section, we present the government’s objective and we describe the mechanism-design prob-
lem. Without intervention, the best equilibrium is (r0, θˆ
0
) described above. The government’s goal
it to find the cheapest possible way to implement any given level of investment.10 We denote the
cost of a government program by Ψ. While the objective of the government is straightforward, the
mechanism-design problem is non-standard because we assume that private markets remain open.
The market rate for non-participating banks, then, depends on the mechanism the government
uses because participation decisions convey information about private types. This interrelation-
ship does not exist in standard mechanism design where outside options are independent from the
mechanism.11 We refer to our model as mechanism design with a “competitive fringe.”
Government’s strategy
A government program P is a menu of contracts. The revelation principle applies and we can,
without loss of generality, consider programs with one contract per type.12 A contract specifies the
cash m injected at time 1 and the schedule of payments yg received by the government at time 2.
A generic program, therefore, takes the form: P = {mθ, ygθ}θ∈Θ. Under A3, ygθ is increasing in y
for all θ ∈ Θ.13
10In a general equilibrium model, one could– after the cost minimization– solve for the optimal level of investment.
We do not study this second stage here. Rather, we characterize the cost-minimizing intervention for any particular
level of investment the government might want to implement.
11In common agency problems, the interelationship of the design problems is more complex since both principals
that offer contracts have bargaining power. In our paper, the principal’s (the government’s) mechanism induces a
competitive market’s response.
12The banks are all ex-ante identical, so the government offers the same menu to all. In a general setup, the
government should condition on observable characteristics, such as size, or leverage, and our results apply after this
conditioning.
13This covers any program based on equity payoffs (common stock, preferred stock, warrants, etc.), as well as all
types of direct lending and debt-guarantee programs. The case of asset purchases can be analyzed by allowing ygθ to
depend on a. We discuss this extension in Section 6.
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Banks’ strategy
The strategy of a bank consists of a participation decision and an investment decision as a function
of its type. At time 0, after the announcement of the government’s program, each bank chooses a
contract in P or opts out by choosing O. We allow banks to randomize their participation decisions.
At time 1, given its type and its realized participation decision, each bank decides whether or not
to invest:
i : Θ× {P ∪ O} → {0, 1} .
The choice of a government contract in P is observed by the market and induces a private lending
contract
(
lθ, y
l
θ
)
. If a bank of type θ chooses a contract
{
mθ′ , y
g
θ′
}
designed for θ′, its cash becomes
c1 = c0 +mθ′ . If it invests, it must then borrow lθ′ = x− c0−mθ′ from the private market, and its
expected payoff is:
V
(
θ, θ′, 1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
y − ylθ′ (y)− ygθ′ (y)
)
f (y|θ) dy. (7)
If it does not invest, its expected payoff is V
(
θ, θ′, 0
)
= E [a|θ] + c0 + mθ′ −
∫∞
0 y
g
θ′ (y) f (y|θ) dy.
If the bank opts out of the government program, it has the option to borrow in the private market
at an interest rate r˜. The outside option of a type θ bank is, therefore,
V˜ (θ, r˜) = E [a|θ] + max {c0, v¯ − ρ (θ, r˜l0)} . (8)
Competitive Fringe
Regardless of whether a bank opts in or out, the interest rate at which it borrows must satisfy the
break-even condition of competitive lenders in equation (2). The information set I contains the
equilibrium strategies of the banks–the participation and investment mappings–and the observed
choices–the particular contract in P and the decision to demand a loan of size l. The loan is
l0 = x − c0 for banks opting out, and l0 − mθ for banks opting in and choosing the contract
designed for θ.
Equilibrium Conditions:
Fix a government intervention and market rate r˜ for non-participating banks. Let ΘP,1 denote
the set of types that participate and invest, and let ΘP,0 denote the types that participate but
do not invest. Define ΘP = ΘP,1 ∪ ΘP,0. Similarly, we can define ΘO,1 (respectively ΘO,0) to be
the corresponding non-participating sets of types, and ΘO = ΘO,1 ∪ ΘO,0. In order to have an
equilibrium we must have:
• For i ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ ΘP,i, V (θ, θ, i) ≥ max
(
V
(
θ, θ′, j
)
, V˜ (θ, r˜)
)
, for j ∈ {0, 1} and
θ′ ∈ ΘP .
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• For all θ ∈ ΘO, V˜ (θ, r˜) ≥ V
(
θ, θ′, j
)
for j ∈ {0, 1} and θ′ ∈ ΘP , and θ ∈ ΘO,1 ⇐⇒ v¯ − x ≥
ρ (θ, r˜l0)− l0.
Private lenders must expect to break even, and their beliefs must be consistent with the equi-
librium behavior of the banks. For instance, if HO,1 denotes the market’s perception about
the distribution of bank types that choose to invest alone, the outside rate r˜ must satisfy l0 =∫
ΘO,1
[∫
Y min (y, r˜l0) f (y|θ) dy
]
dHO,1(θ). Similar conditions must hold for banks that opt in and
borrow lθ = x−c0−mθ. Finally, the resource constraint yl (y)+yg (y) ≤ y must hold for all contracts.
We now, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to interventions where the government
receives junior claims-i.e., where new lenders are paid first according to ylθ (y) = min (y, rθlθ).
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To sum up, the design problem is complex because the participation decision is influenced by
the non-participation payoffs that depend on the market reaction, which is, in turn, endogenous
to the mechanism. In Section 4, we characterize the set of feasible interventions and derive lower
bounds on their costs. In Section 5, we show that these bounds are actually achieved by realistic
and commonly used interventions.
4 Cost Minimizing Interventions
In this section, we study feasible interventions and derive lower bounds for their costs. We ana-
lyze interventions where the competitive fringe is active-i.e., where some banks invest without the
government’s assistance. The case where the competitive fringe is completely inactive-i.e., when
ΘO,1 = ∅- is discussed in Section 5.3.
4.1 Feasible Interventions
Any bank opting out of the program can borrow in the competitive fringe at rate r˜. This rate
defines a marginal type θˆ (r˜) for which condition (4) holds with equality. The government knows
that the outside option of any type below θˆ is to invest, while the outside option of any type above
θˆ is to do nothing. We are going to show that in all feasible interventions, the types that invest
with the help of the government are worse than θˆ. We first introduce some notation and establish
an important building block of our analysis in Lemma 1.
14To see this, imagine a program where the government has some senior claims y˜gsθ and some junior claims y˜
gj
θ .
The optimal private debt contract is y˜lθ = min (y − ygsθ , r˜θlθ) , and from the resource constraint we have ygsθ ≤ y and
y˜gjθ = 0 for all y < r˜ (lθ) lθ. Now consider an alternative program where all government claims are junior. The private
contract is ylθ = min (y, rθlθ). Define y
g
θ = min
(
y − ylθ, r˜θlθ
)
+
(
y˜gsθ + y˜
gj
θ
)
.1y>r˜θlθ . This contract gives exactly the
same payoff function to the bank, so it leaves all participation, incentive, and investment constraints unchanged.
Finally, since lθ = E
[
y˜lθ
]
= E
[
ylθ
]
, it follows that E [ygθ ] = E
[
y˜gsθ + y˜
gj
θ
]
, and the cost to the government is
unchanged.
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Banks that participate and invest receive income y−ylθ−ygθ . The difference between inside and
outside payoffs conditional on investment in both cases is then: γθ(y) ≡ min (y, r˜l0)−min (y, rθlθ)−
ygθ (y) . From the participation constraint V (θ, θ, 1) ≥ V˜ (θ, r˜) of investing types, we then obtain:
E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ ΘP,1. (9)
The following Lemma establishes a Single Crossing Property that plays a central role in our analysis.
Lemma 1 Single Crossing Property. If E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for some θ ∈ Θ, then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
] ≥ 0
for all θ′ < θ. If, in addition, γθ(y) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Y , then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
> 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 1 says that if a type prefers the strategy ‘opt-in-and-invest’ to the strategy ‘invest-alone,’
then all types below it have the same preference. This result is driven by the same forces that cause
the original market failure-namely, that good types expect to repay relatively more than bad types.
An important subtlety, however, is that what matters is the difference in expected payments inside
or outside the program, both of which are increasing in θ. An additional complication is that the
function γθ(y) is not monotonic. It is typically positive for low values of y and then decreasing. The
key is that it can switch sign only once, for some income realization yˆ. This explains why first-order
stochastic dominance is not enough and why we need conditional stochastic dominance (or hazard
rate dominance) in A2. We can then apply stochastic dominance conditional on income being more
(or less) than yˆ, and obtain our result. The interesting point is that A2 is also the necessary and
sufficient condition for debt to be optimal in the capital-raising game under asymmetric information
(Nachman and Noe 1994).
Lemma 1 has several important implications. First, as long as some banks invest without the
government’s help, no type above θˆ (r˜) invests.
Proposition 2 In all equilibria where the competitive fringe is active, no type above θˆ (r˜) invests.
Proof. For non-participating types (θ ∈ ΘO), the Proposition follows from the definition of
θˆ (r˜). For participating types, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that there is a participating
type θ strictly above θˆ (r˜) that invests-that is, θ ∈ ΘP,1. Because θ > θˆ (r˜), we have that V˜ (θ, r˜) >
E [a|θ] + v¯ − ρ (θ, r˜l0). Moreover, since θ ∈ ΘP,1, we must have E [γθ(y)|θ] > 0. From Lemma
1, we then know that E [γθ′(y)|θ] > 0 for all types θ′ < θ. Therefore,
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
⊂ ΘP,1 and
ΘO,1 ⊂
[
θˆ (r˜) , θ¯
]
, but then the rate r˜ must be below the fair rate for the worst type investing alone
θˆ (r˜) , which implies that (4) cannot hold with equality contradicting the definition of θˆ (r˜) .
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Proposition 2 shows that the best type investing is θˆ. It also implies that we can, without loss
of generality, focus on programs where only types below θˆ participate in the government program.
To see why, imagine that a type θ′ > θˆ (r˜) participates. We know that this type does not invest and
that it must get at least its outside option. But then, the government can simply have this type
drop out (by charging an infinitesimal fee, for instance). This does not affect the outside market
rate because θ′ does not invest. Therefore, we have the following corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Without loss of generality, only types below θˆ (r˜) participate in the government’s
program: ΘP ⊂
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
.
Another important implication of Proposition 2 is that the government cannot design a program
that attracts only good banks and induces them to invest. This suggests that all interventions that
increase investment will be costly. This is indeed what we show next.
4.2 Minimum Cost of Intervention
In this section, we obtain lower bounds for the cost of interventions by focusing only on the par-
ticipation constraints. Consider an equilibrium with a given market rate r˜. The total value of the
banking sector equals the expected value of legacy assets, cash and new investments. From the
definition of θˆ (r˜) and Proposition 2, it follows that banks with types above θˆ (r˜) do not invest.
Therefore we have:
W (r˜) = E [a] + c0 + (v¯ − x)
∫ θˆ(r˜)
0
i (θ) dH(θ), (10)
where i(θ) is the investment choice of type θ. Since private lenders break even, the total payoffs of
banks are equal to the total value of the banking sector plus the net transfers from the government.
In other words, the expected cost Ψ is:
W (r˜) + Ψ =
∫
θ∈ΘP
V (θ, θ, i) +
∫
θ∈ΘO
V˜ (θ, r˜) . (11)
The participation constraints impose V (θ, θ, i) ≥ V˜ (θ, r˜) for i ∈ {0, 1}. To minimize Ψ, we
maximize W by setting i (θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ [θ, θˆ (r˜)], and minimize the right-hand side of (11),
by making the participation constraints tight. Letting Ψ∗ be the minimum cost, and W ∗ the
maximized value of W , we have
Ψ∗ (r˜) = E
[
V˜ (θ, r˜)
]
−W ∗ (r˜) . (12)
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From the definition of γθ(y), we know that V (θ, θ, 1)− V˜ (θ, r˜) = E [γθ(y)|θ] for all θ ∈ ΘP,1. From
(11) and (12), we can then write the excess cost of any program as
Ψ−Ψ∗ =
∫
ΘP,1
E [γθ(y)|θ] +
∫
ΘP,0
(
V (θ, θ, 0)− V˜ (θ, r˜)
)
+W ∗ (r˜)−W (r˜) . (13)
Equation (13) says that excess costs arise from rents earned by participating types and from in-
efficient investment. Participation constraints imply that the first two terms are positive, and the
definition of W ∗ implies that the third term is positive. The following Theorem characterizes the
lower bound Ψ∗ and the programs that can reach it.
Theorem 1 Feasible programs are characterized by an investment cutoff θˆ and an associated mar-
ket rate r˜. The cost of a feasible program cannot be less than the informational rents at rate r˜
Ψ∗ (r˜) =
∫ θˆ(r˜)
0
(l0 − ρ (θ, r˜l0)) dH(θ). (14)
A program reaches the lower bound Ψ∗ (r˜) if and only if all types below θˆ invest and γθ(.) is iden-
tically zero for all types above the lowest type.
Proof. Replacing W ∗ (r˜) and V˜ (θ, r˜) in (12) and using l0 = x − c0, we obtain (14). When
i = 1 for all θ ≤ θˆ (r˜), we have W (r˜) = W ∗ (r˜) by definition, and ΘP,0 = ∅ from Corollary 1.
From equation (9), we know that E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for all participating types. If we want Ψ = Ψ∗ in
(13), we must, therefore, have E [γθ(y)|θ] = 0 for θ ∈ ΘP . From Lemma 1, we further know that
if γθ(y) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Y and some type θ ∈ ΘP , then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
> 0 for all θ < θ′, implying
that Ψ > Ψ∗. We must, therefore, have γθ(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y and all θ ∈ ΘP,1/ {θ}.
The lower bound cannot be less than the informational rents at rate r˜ and is strictly positive
for all interventions that increase investment-i.e., for all interventions that implement θˆ (r˜) > θˆ
0
,
since θˆ
0
is the highest type for which the break even constraint (6) holds. To go beyond θˆ
0
, the
government is forced to pay information rents. Theorem 1 tells us that the number and types of
participating banks matters only through r˜. Hence, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 For a given outside rate r˜, the minimum cost does not depend on the participation
in the program.
Let p (θ) ∈ [0, 1] be the participation rate (the probability of participation in the program) for
any type θ ∈ [θ, θˆ (r˜)]. Corollary 2 tells us that the actual participation rate of various types is
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irrelevant so long as it leads to the same market rate. The equilibrium participation function p
must be such that lenders break even on types opting out, when the rate is r˜, that is:
l0 =
∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ
[∫
Y
min (y, r˜l0) f (y|θ) dy
]
(1− p (θ)) dH (θ)∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ (1− p (s)) dH (s)
. (15)
There are many participation rates p that induce the same p. The minimal size program attracts
the worst types, that is p (θ) = 1θ<θp for all types below some cutoff θ
p, that is such that the
break-even constraint l0 =
1
H(θT )−H(θp)
∫ θˆ(r˜)
θp ρ (θ, r˜l0) dH (θ) holds at r˜. At the other extreme, we
can have p (θ) → 1 for all θ ∈
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
and ΘO,1 → ∅.15 Any size between the minimal size and
the limit where all investing types participate delivers the same exact cost and level of investment.
So any size between H (θp) and H
(
θˆ (r˜)
)
can be an equilibrium.
One way to grasp the intuition for the result is the following. Start from the minimal intervention
with size H (θp). Consider the types left out to invest alone, that is types between θp and θˆ (r˜).
Now take a random sample of these types. By definition, the expected repayment for this random
sample is exactly equal to the loan. This has two implications. First, removing the sample does
not change the private rate r˜. Second, adding the sample to the program does not change the
expected cost for the government. Therefore any random sample can be taken and any size between
H (θp) and H
(
θˆ (r˜)
)
can be obtained. Actually, the range of possible participation is even greater
than suggested by this explanation: One can have a program where some types below θp do not
participate, and participation schedules can obviously be discontinuous and contain holes. All
these programs would appear different, since participation would vary greatly, but their cost and
investment level would be exactly the same.
The second important implication of Theorem 1 concerns the schedule of payments received by
the government. The requirement that γθ(.) be identically zero restricts the shape of the payoff
functions that the government should offer, as explained in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Any feasible program that achieves the minimum cost must be such that, for all y ∈ Y
and all θ ∈ ΘP,1/ {θ}
ygθ (y) = min (y, r˜l0)−min (y, rθlθ) . (16)
Theorem 1 tells us what the government can hope to achieve, but the derivation of the lower
bound takes into account only the participation constraints of the banks, ignoring the investment
and incentive constraints. In the next section, we show how to design interventions that reach the
lower bound.
15For instance, start from p(θ) = 1θ<θp and let p increase uniformly for all types in
[
θp, θ¯
]
.
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5 Implementation
We now show that there exist feasible interventions that reach the lower bound Ψ∗. Recall from
Section 2 that the best decentralized equilibrium is characterized by θˆ
0
< θ¯. We can, then,
think of the implementation as follows. The government chooses a target for aggregate investment
θT ∈ (θˆ0, θ¯].16 We study programs that achieve θˆ = θT . Through equation (5), this is equivalent
to choosing a target RT for the market rate. For now, we take θˆ and RT as given, and we study
the minimum cost implementation. This implementation determines the structure of payoffs and
implies an allocation of types to the sets ΘP,1 and ΘO,1.
5.1 Direct lending
Corollary 3 shows that financial instruments that do not have the payoff structure of equation (16)
cannot achieve the lowest cost. This suggests that the government should intervene with debt-like
instruments. This is indeed what we show. We start with the simplest program: direct lending by
the government.
Proposition 3 Let RT be the market rate such that the target type θT is the marginal type. Direct
lending of l0 at rate R
T uniquely implements the desired investment at the minimum cost.
Proof. In order to achieve the investment target θT , the interest rate RT is such that θˆ
(
RT
)
=
θT in equation (5). Note that 1 < RT < r0 since θT ∈ (θˆ0, θ¯]. The program corresponds to
mθ = l0, lθ = 0, and y
g
θ (y) = min
(
y,RT l0
)
for all types. The incentive and investment constraints
are clearly satisfied for all participating banks. Banks in ΘO,0 do not want to participate without
investing since RT > 1. We cannot have r˜ < RT since all banks would then drop out and the
market rate would be r˜ = r0 > RT . We cannot have r˜ > R; otherwise, ΘO,1 = ∅. Hence, we must
have r˜ = RT . Then, γθ(y) = 0 and Ψ = Ψ
∗.
The direct-lending program implements the desired level of investment and achieves the mini-
mum cost, which are the only outcomes the government cares about. The key point is that incentives
and investment constraints are satisfied, while participation constraints hold with equality for all
participating types. With other programs, such as equity injections, the participation constraint
binds only for the best participating type while all others receive rents.17
16This is equivalent to a target xH
(
θT
)
for investment spending, or a target (v¯ − x)H (θT ) for value added.
17The only exception is when only the worst type participates-i.e., ΘP = {θ}. With an atom-less distribution, such a
program cannot increase investment, but if Pr (θ = θ) > 0, the government might choose a program where ΘP = {θ}.
Then optimality requires that E
[
γθ(y)|θ
]
= 0, and this can be achieved in various ways. For instance, the government
might offer cash m against a share α of equity returns. Opting into the program reveals the type to the lenders and
we must have E [min (y, rθlθ) |θ] = l0 − m. The condition E
[
γθ(y)|θ
]
= 0 simply implies (1− α)m − αE [y|θ] =
17
5.2 Equivalent Implementations
While the optimal payoff-relevant outcomes are unique, some details of the implementation are not.
We now discuss how equivalent implementations can vary along three dimensions: extensive margin
(participation), intensive margin (size of the loan), and security design (direct lending versus debt
guarantees). As explained in Corollary 2, the actual participation rate of various types is irrelevant
so long as it leads to the same market rate. For simplicity in the following discussion, we consider a
participation function of the type p (θ) = 1θ<θp . Then θ
p is uniquely pinned down by the break-even
constraint l0 =
1
H(θT )−H(θp)
∫ θT
θp ρ
(
θ,RT l0
)
dH (θ) .
Given a participation function consistent with r˜ = RT in the competitive fringe, the government
still has several choices regarding the size of its loans. Consider a program where the government
lends m < l0 at a rate R < R
T . Participating types [θ, θp] must now borrow lu = l0 −m on the
market at a rate r that satisfies the zero-profit condition of the lenders
lu = l0 −m = 1
H (θp)
∫ θp
θ
ρ (θ, rlu) dH (θ) . (17)
Given θp, equation (17) defines a schedule rlu strictly decreasing in m. Finally, the face value of the
government loan Rm must satisfy the condition γ = 0-i.e., Rm+rlu (m) = RT l0. The case analyzed
in Proposition 3 corresponds to m = l0, rl
u = 0, and R = RT . We cannot have R < 1; otherwise,
some banks would take the cash without investing. The minimal lending program mmin is defined
as the unique solution to rlu (m) + m − RT l0 = 0.18 Any outcome that can be implemented by
lending l0 at rate R
T can also be implemented by a continuum of programs with m ∈ (mmin, l0]
and R ∈ (1, RT ].19
The government also has a choice of which debt-like instrument to use. In particular, direct-
lending and debt-guarantee programs are equivalent. Instead of lending directly, the government
can guarantee new debt up to S for a fee φ per unit of face value. Private lenders accept an
interest rate of 1 on the guaranteed debt. The debt-guarantee and direct-lending programs are
equivalent when R = (1− φ)−1 and m = (1− φ)S. In practice, central banks use direct lending,
while governments seem to favor debt guarantees. A reason might be that, while equivalent in
ρ (θ, r˜l0) − l0. The parameters (m,α) pin down the generosity of the program and therefore, in equilibrium, the
outside rate r˜. The more bad types that opt in, the lower is r˜, and the more costly the program becomes.
18The solution exists because the function is continuous, negative at m = l0 since rl
u (l0) = 0 and R
T > 1, and
positive at m = 0 since rlu (l0) ≥ RT l0. The solution is unique because ∂rlu∂m < −1. To see why, notice that (17)
implies ∂rl
u
∂m
= − H(θp)∫ θp
θ
∂ρ(θ,rlu)
∂rlu
dH(θ)
and (3) implies ∂ρ(θ,rl
u)
∂rlu
= 1− F (rlu|θ) < 1.
19The only potential issue is unicity. The endogeneity of the borrowing rate r could lead to multiple equilibria for
some distribution H. This problem can be ruled out if we allow coordination on the best feasible outcome, or if we
impose enough concavity on H (log-concavity is often used in mechanism design for this purpose). Note, however,
that this multiplicity does not arise from the intervention itself, since it is also present without intervention, as
discussed in Section 2. It is different from the multiplicity created by menus, which occurs for any distribution, as
discussed below.
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market-value terms, the programs differ in accounting terms since debt guarantees are contingent
liabilities and do not appear as increases in public debt.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of menus arguing that they are dominated by
simple programs. Notice that the payoff structure of equation (16) applies to all interventions. Even
with menus, the government must use debt-like instruments. Proposition 3 describes an optimal
implementation using one debt contract. In the Appendix, we describe interventions with menus of
debt contracts. While (non-trivial) menus can implement an optimal outcome, they can never do so
uniquely. Alongside the equilibrium where each type chooses the correct contract, there is always
an equilibrium where all the types pool on the contract designed for the worst type. Any non-trivial
menu can, thus, overshoot its target and end up costing more than intended. This cannot happen
with simple programs since all participating types already pool on the unique contract offered by
the government. In this sense, simple programs are more robust than programs with menus.
5.3 Implementation without Competitive Fringe
We have assumed so far that some fraction of banks invest outside the government program.
Given this assumption, we established in Proposition 2 that, in equilibrium, only types below
a threshold can invest. This result remains true–and is actually easier to establish–if the com-
petitive fringe is inactive and no bank invests outside the program. The difference between
participation and non-participation payoff conditional on investing in the program is v¯ − c0 −∫
Y
[
min (y, rθlθ) + y
g
θ (y)
]
f (y|θ) dy. The first two terms are the same for all types, whereas the
term
∫
Y
[
min (y, rθlθ) + y
g
θ (y)
]
f (y|θ) dy is increasing in θ. This immediately implies that if θ
prefers to participate and invest rather than drop out, all types below prefer to do the same.
Proposition 3 tells us how to design an optimal government intervention.
Corollary 4 Direct lending of l0 at rate R
T (or the equivalent debt guarantee) is also optimal when
ΘO,1 = ∅.
When the competitive fringe is inactive and ΘO,1 = ∅, the government implements exactly the
same outcome with direct lending of l0 at rate R
T . The only difference is that all types below the
marginal type now participate-i.e., ΘP =
[
θ, θT
]
-while the latent market rate is some r˜ strictly
above RT (and below r∗θ). The market is then effectively irrelevant.
Corollary 5 The cost of implementing θT is Ψ∗ even if private markets are shut down.
The second corollary says that the competitive fringe does not impose extra costs when the
government uses an optimal implementation. The intuition is that the minimum cost is pinned
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down by participation constraints when private markets are active, and by incentive constraints
when private markets are shut down or irrelevant. In both cases, the constraints bind at the same
marginal type θT . This marginal type always earns E
[
a|θT ] + c0 since the value of investment
v¯ − x is exactly dissipated by informational rents ρ (θT , RT l0)− l0.
We summarize our results in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs uniquely implement any desired invest-
ment at minimum cost, remain optimal if the markets shut down, and are more robust than programs
with menus.
6 Extensions
In this section, we provide three important extensions to our main results. The first extension
is to consider asymmetric information with respect to new investment opportunities. The second
extension is to analyze asset purchases. The third extension is to consider the consequences of
moral hazard in addition to adverse selection.
6.1 Asymmetric information about new loans
We have assumed so far that the distribution of v is independent of the bank’s type. Let us now
relax this assumption, while maintaining assumptions A2 and A3. We replace A1 by:
Assumption A1’: E [v|θ] > x and E [v|θ] is increasing in θ.
Our results hold under A1’. Banks continue to offer debt contracts, and expected repayments
are still given by ρ (θ, rl). The investment condition, however, becomes E [v|θ] − x > ρ (θ, rl) − l
for type θ. The significant difference is that it might potentially hold for good banks and not for
bad banks. This does not, however, change the nature of the decentralized equilibrium: There is
still some threshold below which types invest. Proposition 1 still holds, and the results in Sections
3 to 5 are unaffected.20
20Note that A1’ implies that all types still have positive NPV projects. When E [v|θ] < x, the complication is
that Proposition 1 need not hold. Essentially, adverse selection worsens and total market breakdowns are possible
(equilibria where decentralized investment is zero). Interventions can become, at the same time, more desirable and
more expensive (since the government finances some negative NPV projects). As long as A2 holds, however, debt
contracts are still optimal, and, based on the discussion in Section 5, we conjecture that optimal interventions still
involve simple debt-guarantee programs or direct lending.
20
6.2 Asset Purchases
Our benchmark model follows Myers and Majluf (1984) in assuming that cash flows are fungible.
Assumption A1 rules out contracts written directly on a. We can dispense with this assumption
in two ways: One possibility is to assume asymmetric information with respect to v, as explained
above.21 Another possibility is to allow asset purchases, but not spin-offs. In other words, we can
allow contracts that are increasing in both a and y.22 One such contract is the purchase of Z units
of face value of the legacy assets. If p is the purchase prize, the net payoffs are aZ/A − pZ. All
our results hold in this setup. We can show that banks continue to offer debt contracts, and that
optimal interventions still use debt-guarantee or direct-lending programs. Moreover, we can show
that, among sub-optimal interventions, asset purchases do strictly worse than equity injections.
6.3 Moral hazard
Our benchmark model takes investment opportunities as exogenous. In practice, however, banks
can partially control the riskiness of their new loans. To understand how endogenous risk-taking
affects our results, we introduce a new project with random payoff v′. This project also costs
x but is riskier (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) and has a lower expected
value: E [v′] < E [v]. To emphasize moral hazard created by government interventions, we assume
that market participants can detect the choice of v′, but this choice is not contractible by the
government.23
Assumption A4: The choice of project v′ is observed by private lenders but cannot be controlled
by the government.
Under A4, we can derive three important results (the proofs are in the appendix). First, there
is no risk-shifting without government intervention, and Proposition 1 is unchanged. The intuition
is that choosing v′ is doubly costly. It increases the borrowing rate because of greater objective
risk (a direct effect), but it also sends a negative signal about the bank’s type. This indirect effect
occurs because good types dislike high rates relatively more than bad types.24
21A particularly simple case to analyze is when investment simply scales up existing operations. We can capture
this with v = αa for some constant α. In this case, we can allow contracts to be written on either a or v.
22This rules out a contract on v = y − a, which is effectively a spin-off. Details can be found in an earlier version
of the paper and are available upon request.
23Either because the government has an inferior detection technology and does not observe v′, or because this
choice cannot be verified as in the incomplete contract literature. The point of A4 is to study inefficiencies created by
government interventions. If v′ is not observable by private investors, risk-shifting occurs with or without government
intervention.
24In fact, it is easy to see that good types would be willing sacrifice NPV in exchange for safer projects because
such anti-risk shifting would function as a costly signaling device. Good banks would become too conservative in
their lending policies during a crisis in order to signal their types. We note that this would make debt guarantees
more appealing since guarantees would lean against the conservatism bias.
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The second result is that government interventions are more likely to induce moral hazard when
government loans are larger. Risk-taking might occur because the government lends at a rate that is
independent of the project chosen. The risk of moral hazard is maximized by the program
(
l0, R
T
)
and minimized by the program
(
mmin, 1
)
described in Section 5.2.
The third point is that, even if moral hazard occurs with minimal lending, the government can
solve the problem by making the intervention contingent on the rate at which the bank borrows
from private lenders. The government lends mmin at rate R = 1 as long as the private lenders’ rate
r does not exceed the rate consistent with equation (17). Otherwise, the government charges the
same rate as the private lenders. Any risk-shifting deviation would bring the bank back to the case
without intervention, where we have already seen that risk-shifting does not take place. Hence,
deviations never occur and risk-shifting is eliminated.
Proposition 4 The government can prevent risk-shifting by making its lending rate contingent on
the rate charged by private lenders.
We conclude that moral hazard has important implications for the design of interventions. It
breaks the equivalence results of Section 5.2 and makes it optimal for the government to never be the
sole lender. With small-loan interventions, the government can prevent risk-shifting by observing
private rates even if the government itself has no direct monitoring technology. The same results
apply with debt guarantees.
7 Conclusion
We provide a complete characterization of optimal interventions to restore efficient lending and
investment in markets where inefficiencies arise because of asymmetric information.
We show that the mere existence of a government program affects the borrowing costs of all
banks, even the ones that do not participate in the program. These endogenous borrowing costs
determine the outside option of participating banks and, therefore, the cost of implementing the
program. We find that it is impossible to attract only better banks and that the government can
attract only types below a target threshold. This threshold depends on the interest rate that non-
participating banks face, and it pins down both the level of investment and cost of the optimal
program. Our most remarkable result is that the optimal intervention can be implemented by offer-
ing a simple program of debt guarantees or of direct lending. These simple and realistic programs
are optimal among all possible interventions aimed at increasing investment. If we consider moral
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hazard in addition to adverse selection, we find that the government can prevent risk-shifting by
making the terms of the program contingent on the borrowing terms that banks face in the private
markets.
On the technical side, we solve a non-standard mechanism-design problem with two information-
sensitive decisions (investing or not, participating or not) and in the presence of a competitive fringe
(the government does not shut down the private markets).
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof focuses on the shape of the function γθ(y) ≡ min(y, r˜l0)−min(y, rθlθ)− ygθ (y). We first
show that γθ is weakly positive for low values of y, and then decreasing. Recall that y
g
θ is increasing
in y, and the resource constraint imposes yg ≤ y − min(y, rθlθ). For y ≤ min(r˜l0, rθlθ), we have
y = min(y, rθlθ) and, therefore, γθ = −yg ≥ 0. If r˜l0 < rθlθ, then γ is decreasing for all y > r˜l0. If
r˜l0 > rθlθ, the relevant case in later analysis, then for y ∈ [rθlθ, r˜l0], we have γθ = y− rθlθ − ygθ(y).
Since yg ≤ y− rθlθ, this means γθ ≥ 0. For y > r˜l0, we have γθ(y) = r˜l0 − rθlθ − ygθ(y) decreasing
in y since ygθ is increasing. We conclude that, in all cases, γθ is weakly positive for low values of y,
and then decreasing. There are two possibilities: Either γθ(y) ≥ 0 for all y, or there exists a yˆ such
that γθ(y) < 0 for all y > yˆ. If γθ(y) ≥ 0, then the Lemma (both with both weak and with strong
inequalities) follows directly from the first part of A2. In the second case, E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 implies
that ∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy ≥
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy. (18)
Since γθ(y) < 0 for all y > yˆ, both sides are strictly positive. Consider θ
′ < θ.
For y > yˆ, we know that γθ is negative and decreasing, implying that −γθ is positive and
increasing. The monotone hazard rate property implies conditional expectation dominance (see
Nachman and Noe (1994)) that gives us
∫∞
yˆ −γθ(y) f(y|θ)1−F (yˆ|θ)dy >
∫∞
yˆ −γθ(y) f(y|θ
′)
1−F (yˆ|θ′)dy or∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy >
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy. (19)
The monotone hazard rate property implies that 1−F (y|θ)
1−F (y|θ′) is increasing in y, which, together with
the definition of MHR, implies that f (y|θ) ≤ f (y|θ′) 1−F (yˆ|θ)
1−F (yˆ|θ′) . Then, for all y < yˆ, we have∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy <
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy. (20)
Combining (19) with (20), we finally obtain:
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy > 1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ (y) f
(
y|θ′) dy,
and, therefore, E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
=
∫∞
0 γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy > 0.
B Menus
Suppose that the government offers a menu of contracts (mθ, Rθ) where mθ is the loan and Rθ is
the interest rate. Type θ then borrows lθ = l0 −mθ from the market, and since the choice of the
contract reveals the type, the zero profit condition type by type implies:
ρ (θ, rθlθ) = l0 −mθ. (21)
In order for the menu to be optimal, we need γθ(y) = 0, or, equivalently,
Rθmθ + rθlθ = R
T l0. (22)
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The menu is feasible if and only if (21) and (22) are satisfied and Rθ ≥ 1 for all θ. There are
obviously several ways to design a menu. Since ∂ρ(θ,rθlθ)∂rθlθ = 1− F (rθlθ|θ), the menu must solve the
differential system
∂ρ
∂θ
dθ + (1− F (rθlθ|θ)) d (rθlθ) + dmθ = 0,
d (Rθmθ) + d (rθlθ) = 0.
For concreteness, we study ΘP = [θ, θp] and Rθ = 1 for all types in ΘP . Then, the schedule is
pinned down by the differential equation
F (rθlθ|θ) dmθ = −∂ρ
∂θ
dθ for all θ ∈ ΘP ,
and the initial condition ρ
(
θp, RT l0 −mθp
)
= l0 − mθp . Government loans decrease with θ and
compensate the types for revealing their private information. This menu is clearly feasible and
reaches the lower bound for cost Ψ∗.
Menus, however, are susceptible to multiple equilibria. To see why, imagine that all types in
ΘP pool on the contract designed for the worst type θ. Let r¯ be the corresponding break-even rate.
Clearly, we must have r¯ < rθ. Therefore, Rθmθ + r¯lθ < Rθmθ + rθlθ = R
T l0. This deviation is
profitable for all types and is incompatible with θT remaining the marginal type. The equilibrium
will then be one of a unique contract of lending mθ at rate Rθ, but with a strictly higher marginal
type θˆ > θT and a strictly higher cost.
C Moral Hazard
We prove three claims: (i) there is no risk-shifting without interventions; (ii) smaller government
loans create less moral hazard; and (iii) there exists a simple contingent program that removes
moral hazard.
For (i), consider an equilibrium with risk-shifting. Let r be the borrowing rate for v and r′ > r
for v′. Type θ chooses to risk-shift if and only if
v¯ − ρ (θ, rl0) > v¯′ − ρ′
(
θ, r′l0
)
.
It is clear that if particular type θ wants to risk-shift, a worst type would also want to risk-shift.25
Hence, the set of risk-shifting types is Θ′ =
[
θ, θ′
]
for some θ′. We first show that Θ′ = ∅ when
there is no intervention.
Lemma 2 The decentralized equilibrium without intervention is unaffected by the availability of
project v′.
Proof. Consider the highest type θ′ that chooses v′. For type θ′ we have ρ
(
θ′, r′l0
)
> l0 since θ
′
pools with lower types. This type can strictly benefit by choosing v because v is safer and because
it would pool with better types.
For (ii), suppose that the government lends l0 at R
T . Then the condition for risk-shifting to
occur is
ρ
(
θ,RT l0
)− ρ′ (θ,RT l0) > v¯ − v¯′. (23)
The bank faces no penalty for risk-shifting, apart from the NPV loss. If condition (23) holds for
θ, then some risk-shifting does occur in the program with large loans. When m < l0, on the other
hand, we need to look for a cutoff θ′ such that
l0 −m = E
[
ρ′
(
θ,Rm+ r′lu
) | θ ∈ [θ, θ′]] ,
25This always holds when banks can offer menus of borrowing and projects and the inscrutability principle holds
as in Myerson (1983). If there is signalling at the proposal stage we need a refinement to rule out unreasonable
equilibria where risk taking happens to be a good signal.
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and
l0 −m = E
[
ρ (θ,Rm+ rlu) | θ ∈ [θ′, θp]] .
The condition for risk-shifting is the indifference of the marginal type: ρ
(
θ′, Rm+ rlu
)−ρ′ (θ,Rm+ r′lu) =
v¯ − v¯′. This is clearly stronger than condition (23) because of the risk-sensitive rate and the ad-
verse signalling effect. The government needs to maximize the amount borrowed on the market to
minimize risk-shifting incentives. Within the class of interventions studied in the paper, it does so
by lending m = mmin defined below equation (17).
For (iii), consider the implementation with lending mmin at rate R = 1. Define r∗ as the solution
to
l0 −m = E
[
ρ
(
θ,mmin + r∗lu
) | θ ∈ [θ, θp]] .
Suppose that the government offers to lend mmin at rate R = 1 as long as r ≤ r∗, and at a rate
equal to the private rate for this bank (R = r) otherwise. If a bank risk-shifts, its interest rate
will strictly exceed r∗ and it will be punished by losing the government subsidy. From the above
discussion, it is clear that no bank will ever risk-shift. QED.
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